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THE FOUNDERS GO ON-LINE:
AN ORIGINAL INTENT SOLUTION
TO A JURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA*
The Internet has created a blossoming cyber-economy and a new way of
conducting business. Unfortunately for those looking forjurisdictional certainty,
however, cyberspace also effectively eliminates geographic boundaries. The
unprecedented circumstances set by this new frontier have put federal courts in the
unenviable position of deciding whether Internet-based cases meet diversity
jurisdiction requirements. Examining the constitutional history and recent use of
diversity, this Note argues that the Founders did not foresee an era where every
contract or sales case would end up in federal court; rather, they intended diversity
jurisdiction to be a rare and perhaps temporary proposition. The author argues
that the potential of Internet-based contacts to throw a large number of cases into
federal court could overburden the federal system. This Note suggests that the
solution to this problem lies in courts following the Founder's intent.
INTRODUCTION
Every second, seven people around the globe log on to the Internet for the first
time.' Car buying, auction bidding, stock trading and even prescription filling have
moved on-line, and e-business appears poised to take over entire sectors of the
economy. In 1998, cyber-economy generated $301 billion in revenues, and Internet
business-to-business transactions alone are predicted to climb to $1.3 trillion by
2003.' Visa and American Express reported that the 1999 holiday season saw an
increase in on-line sales by their cardholders of some 179 to 200 percent over the
previous year's totals,3 revealing a massive migration of ordinary consumers into
the realm of virtual shopping. Although a powerful and apparently benevolent force
in the economy, cyberspace has created a legal tangle over which courts should hear
disputes involving on-line transactions.
Given the Internet's lack of geographic boundaries, an increasing number of
cases will be brought in diversity, with the potential to overburden the federal
* This Note is dedicated to the memory of Adolf Lewkowicz. I would like to thank
Professor Mechele Dickerson for her invaluable comments on an earlier draft and my
husband Joshua for his patience and support.
' See Mark Leibovich et al., Internet's E-conomy Gets Real: New Business Math Gains
Solid Ground, WASH. POST, June 20, 1999, at A 1.
2 See id
' See Saul Hansell, Retailers Look Back and See Online Shopping Is Gaining, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 1999, at Al.
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courts. Diversity does not automatically create federal jurisdiction, however, and
courts are struggling with the due process requirements for asserting jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant based on virtual contacts. Unfortunately, the circuits
have provided little guidance on the issue. District courts have not followed what
few decisions the appellate courts and other district courts in their circuits have
offered, resulting in widespread uncertainty regarding where a plaintiff should bring
suit. Many districts have dealt with the issue by twisting precedent into a weak and
unpredictable rationale for dismissing suits based on Internet contacts. A similar
result could be reached, however, with a simpler analysis. A careful analysis of the
original purposes of diversity jurisdiction demonstrates that the application of
traditional diversity principles to today's connected society far exceeds the intended
scope of federal jurisdiction as envisioned by the Founding Fathers.
Part I discusses the history of diversity jurisdiction through an examination of
its constitutional origins, statutory history, and recent judicial findings. Part II
explores the short history of Internet jurisdiction with particular emphasis on
relevant circuit court holdings. Part III examines recent district court decisions on
the issue, including short summaries of some typical well-reasoned and poorly-
reasoned decisions. Part IV analyzes Internet-related diversity jurisdiction in light
of the Founders' original intent, and Part V suggests that district courts could reach
the same conclusions on Internetjurisdiction by using original intent rather than by
twisting and sometimes misusing the scant precedent other courts have offered.
I. THE HISTORY OF DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 4
A. The Beginning
Like the history of the Article III courts themselves, the history of diversity
jurisdiction began at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Unlike the Article III
courts, however, diversity jurisdiction did not arouse the passions of the Founding
4 See generally 13B CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3601 (1984) (outlining the history of diversity jurisdiction from the
Constitutional Convention through recent changes and reforms); John P. Frank, Historical
Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1948) (suggesting
theories for the Founders' inclusion of diversity); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution ofJudicial
Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928) (presenting
a clear history ofjudicial power and a criticism of diversity); Henry J. Friendly, The Historic
Basis ofDiversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1928) (arguing that the Founders had
no real basis for creating diversity jurisdiction); James William Moore & Donald T.
Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1964)
(offering a general history of diversity jurisdiction); Charles Warren, New Light on the
History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49 (1923) (exploring the
Founders' intent and debates on the Article III courts, including diversity jurisdiction).
[Vol. 9: l
THE FOUNDERS Go ON-LINE
Fathers. Most scholars agree that the Convention records contain little mention of
diversity jurisdiction at all, and an even smaller showing of support.5
Diversity jurisdiction had an inauspicious birth and an uneasy childhood. Far
from an intuitive, fundamental principle, only one of the plans submitted to the
Convention contained a provision for federal jurisdiction over disputes between
citizens of different states.6 The Virginia Plan originally proposed that the federal
judiciary havejurisdiction "to hear... cases in which foreigners or citizens of other
States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested,"7 similar to the modem
understanding of diversity.
Although the Virginia Plan's language regarding diversity appeared strong and
unambiguous, no one supported it with any vigor during the state debates on the
proposed constitution. James Madison, the main author of the only plan suggesting
diversity, prefaced his rather half-hearted defense of the concept with: "As to its
cognizance of disputes between citizens of different states, I will not say it is a
matter of much importance. Perhaps it might be left to the state courts."8 Other
strong proponents of the Virginia Plan mirrored Madison's spiritlessness regarding
diversity. John Marshall, a staunch supporter of a strong federal judiciary, stated:
"Were I to contend that this was necessary in all cases, and that the government
without it would be defective, I should not use my own judgment."9 Even Edmund
Randolph, who first introduced the diversity jurisdiction proposals to the
Convention, commented that he did "not see any absolute necessity for vesting [the
federal courts] with jurisdiction in these cases."'"
See, e.g., Frank, supra note 4, at 23 (noting that support for diversity jurisdiction was
"tepid"); Friendly, supra note 4, at 487 ("The most astounding thing, however, is not the
vigor of the attack but the apathy of the defense."); Warren, supra note 4, at 81 ("There was
no part of the Federal jurisdiction which had sustained so strong an attack from the Anti-
Federalists, or which had received so weak a defense from the Federalists.").
6 The New Jersey, Hamilton, Pinckney, and Blair Plans all contained provisions for the
federal judiciary, but none proposed that federal courts hear disputes between parties of
diverse citizenship. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 593 app. C
(Max Farrand, ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS] (the Virginia Plan); 3 RECORDS,
supra, at 595 app. D (the Pinckney Plan); 3 RECORDS, supra, at 611 app. E (the New Jersey
Plan); 3 RECORDS, supra, at 617 app. F (the Hamilton Plan); Moore & Weckstein, supra
note 4, at 2 n.3 (noting the existence of the Blair Plan but the Convention's lack of
discussion regarding it).
1 RECORDS, supra note 6, at 22.
3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 533 (Jonathan Elliot, 2d ed., photo. reprint 1941) (1836) [hereinafter
DEBATES].
9 Id. at 556.
"0 Id. at 572.
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The Virginia Plan's words on diversity lacked support in the Committee of the
Whole, prompting Randolph and Madison to amend the Plan so that federal
jurisdiction extended to cases "which respect the collection of the National revenue;
impeachments of any National officers, and questions which may involve the
national peace and harmony."" This version, which included diversityjurisdiction
only indirectly through the "national peace and harmony" clause, passed the
Committee's scrutiny. The final amended version submitted to the Committee of
Detail similarly failed to mention diversity jurisdiction in its text. 2 This does not
indicate, however, that the supporters of the Virginia Plan had abandoned diversity
jurisdiction. Several of the proposed drafts to the Committee of Detail included
diversity, 3 and the final version, embodied in the Constitution, provided that "[t]he
judicial power shall extend... to controversies ... between citizens of different
States."'
14
The debate over diversityjurisdiction acquired more substance as it entered the
public sphere. The topic appeared in both Federalist and Anti-Federalist materials
as the states considered ratification of the proposed constitution. The Federalists,
through Alexander Hamilton, argued that diversity jurisdiction was necessary in
order to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause" and to avoid the confusion
and animosity that would be caused by thirteen different state courts reaching
thirteen different conclusions on an issue, each refusing to recognize the other's
judgments.'6 The Federalists also argued that the federal courts were superior to
state courts because of the life tenure of judges, jury pools from broader areas,
judges' freedom to comment on evidence, the greater experience of federal judges,
and similar arguments, and thus created a strong justification for channeling as
many cases as possible into the federal system.'7
The Anti-Federalists set forth their arguments with equal force and eloquence.
Prominent orators such as Patrick Henry argued that diversity jurisdiction would
undermine state courts or, in the extreme, totally destroy them: "I see arising out
of that paper a tribunal that is to be recurred to in all cases, when the destruction of
state judiciaries shall happen; and, from the extensive jurisdiction of these
paramount courts, the state courts must soon be annihilated."'" Henry, along with
George Mason, further argued that diversity would force citizens to try their cases
in distant federal courts, increasing the cost of litigation and denying poor litigants
access to justice. As Mason illustrated to the Virginia state convention: "What!
" 1 RECORDS, supra note 6, at 22.
12 See 2 id. at 38-39.
'3 See, e.g., id. at 147 (draft of Edmund Randolph); id. at 173 (draft of James Wilson).
14 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
5 d. art. IV, § 2.
16 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton).
'" See id. No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
18 3 DEBATES, supra note 8, at 542.
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Carry me a thousand miles from home-from my family and business .... Perhaps
I have a respectable witness who saw me pay the money; but I must carry him one
thousand miles to prove it, or be compelled to pay it again."' 9 Mason also noted
that such a system could result in nuisance litigation: "Suppose I have your bond
for a thousand pounds: if I have any wish to harass you, or if I be of a litigious
disposition, I have only to assign it to a gentleman in Maryland. This assignment
will involve you in trouble and expense.""0
The Anti-Federalists also expressed concern that the doctrine would result in
federal judges misapplying or creating state law." Because a federal court sitting
in diversity over a state claim would not be bound by state decisions, it could
interpret (or misapply) the state law however it saw fit. The more moderate Anti-
Federalists argued that state courts were in a better position to apply state law
accurately and efficiently.22 James Winthrop, writing as "Agrippa," took this
argument a step further. He argued that Congress, through the power given it by the
Necessary and Proper Clause,23 would make laws governing the federal courts, and
if the federal courts were deciding state claims, Congress could legislate on what
should be a state issue. By virtue of the Supremacy Clause,24 any law of Congress
had to be followed by the states, so the states would be forced to follow federally-
made law on a state issue.25
After all the debate, and regardless of the hesitancy of some of the Founders,
the state conventions ratified the Constitution-including the clause granting
federal courts diversity jurisdiction--on September 17, 1787.26
B. Statutory History
Immediately following ratification and the first congressional elections, the new
Congress began work codifying the specifics of the Article III courts, including the
statutory requirements for diversity jurisdiction. The resulting legislation, the
Judiciary Act of 1789, provided that federal courts would entertain diversity actions
'9 Id. at 526. See also id. at 529,551 (quoting George Mason of Virginia); 4 id. at 138-39
(quoting Judge Spencer of North Carolina).
20 3 id. at 526.
21 In ivore recent times, the Erie doctrine obviated some of this argument. The Court in
Erie held that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state common law and may not
devise their own interpretation of state legislation. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
80 (1938).
22 See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note 8, at 521-22 (quoting George Mason at the Virginia
Convention); 4 id. at 164 (quoting Judge Spencer at the North Carolina Convention).
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
24 Id. art. VI.
25 See Letter of "Agrippa" (James Winthrop), MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 11, 1787.
26 U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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for suits between a citizen of the state where the suit commenced and a citizen of
another state, where the amount in controversy exceeded $500.27 Although the
Judiciary Act of 1801 attempted to lower the amount in controversy requirement to
$400, Congress repealed this revision the following year.28
Congress' first attempt to legislate diversity jurisdiction stood unaltered for
nearly eighty years. In the interim, the Supreme Court decided Strawbridge v.
Curtiss,29 the first judge-made limitation on the bounds of diversity jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion established the "complete diversity" rule, which
provided that, in multi-party actions, federal diversity jurisdiction requires that no
defendant be a citizen of the same state as any of the plaintiffs.3°
The Judiciary Act and Strawbridge v. Curtiss provided a strong backbone for
diversity jurisdiction, and no judicial or legislative action attempted to change the
status quo for sixty years. The post-Civil War era, by contrast, ushered in a flurry
of alterations, most of which acted to increase the number of diversity cases heard
in federal courts. The Separable Controversy Act of 1866 allowed defendants in
multi-defendant state litigation to remove their case to a federal court if they were
citizens of a different state than the plaintiff, so long as a judgment rendered in
regards to them would not affect the remaining defendants' cases.3 The Act of
1867 allowed either a plaintiff or a defendant in a state court to remove to federal
court if they satisfied the "complete diversity" rule and upon showing by affidavit
that the party had reason to believe that he could not obtainjustice in the state court
because of prejudice or local influence.32
Continuing the post-Civil War era's unprecedented expansion of diversity
jurisdiction, the Act of 1875 provided that federal diversity jurisdiction would lie
in any district in which the defendant was an inhabitant or could be found for
service of process, opening the door for suits in any state in which a corporation did
business through an agent or otherwise." The Act also broadened the scope of
diversityjurisdiction by allowing holders of promissory notes to sue in federal court
regardless of the citizenship of the original assignor.34 Although the Act mostly
operated to expand federal jurisdiction, Congress did create a new limitation:
improperly or collusively joined parties could not be used to create diversity."
It did not take long for Congress to realize that the result of these post-bellum
expansions of federal jurisdiction was the overburdening of the Article III courts.
27 See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
28 See Act of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132 (1802).
29 3 U.S. (Cranch) 267 (1806).
30 See id. at 267-68.
3, SeeAct of July 27, 1866, 14 Stat. 306 (1866), U.S.,Comp. Stat. (1916) § 1018.
32 See Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 558 (1867).
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In response to this problem, the legislature passed the Judiciary Act of 1887-88,36
which narrowed the scope of diversity jurisdiction. The Act increased the amount
in controversy requirement to $2,000, restricted "citizenship" to the state where a
defendant was an "inhabitant" rather than where he "shall be found," forbade
plaintiffs who initiated a suit in state court to remove to federal court, and returned
to the original 1789 rule that suits for promissory notes could only be brought in
courts where the assignor could have filed suit." The Act achieved the desired
result of calming the influx of federal diversity cases. With one minor exception,3"
Congress again bowed out of Article III diversity jurisdiction reform and remained
silent on the issue for sixty years.
The year 1948 saw the most code-drafting on the federal judiciary the nation
had seen since the original Judiciary Act. Congress essentially wiped out the old
judiciary laws and started fresh, and the result was the Judicial Code of 194839-
the basis of the current provisions. In simple terms, the Code provided that "[t]he
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and is between ... Citizens of different States .... ,40 The revisions to the Judicial
Code's diversity provisions have been minor. The 1956 amendments increased the
amount in controversy, requirement to $10,000, clarified that a corporation is
deemed a citizen of both its state of incorporation and the state of its principle place
of business, and provided that the word "states" included Puerto Rico.4' Congress
increased the amount in controversy requirement to $50,000 in 1988,42 and then to
its current level of $75,000 in 1996.43
Diversity jurisdiction has thus come almost full circle, statutorily speaking,
from the 1789 Act granting federal jurisdiction to cases between citizens of
different states, to the post-Civil War provisions expanding diversity and increasing
the federal caseload, and back to the simplicity of its bare constitutional definition,
as codified in the Judicial Code of 1948.
36 Judiciary Act of 1887-88, §§ 1 and 3, 24 Stat. 552 (1887), U.S. Comp. Stat. (1916) §§
991(1), 991(2), 1010, 1011, 1012, 1033, 1048.
3 See id
38 See Act of 1911, §§ 24 and 28, 36 Stat. 1091 (1911), U.S. Comp. Stat. (1916) §
991(1). The 1911 Act raised the amount in controversy requirement to $3,000, but otherwise
effected no substantial change on federal diversity jurisdiction.
39 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1948).
4 Id
41 See Act of July 26, 1956, 70 Stat. 658 (1956).
' See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Act of November 19, 1988, 102
Stat. 4642 (1988).
43 See Federal Courts Improvement Act, Act of October 19, 1996, Pub. L. 104-317, §
205, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (1996).
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C. Due Process Requirements
While Congress worked to define the statutory requirements for federal
diversity jurisdiction, the Supreme Court attempted to define the doctrine's
constitutional limitations. Beginning in 1945, the Court struggled to delineate when
a court could exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant without violating
due process." As is common with many due process issues, no clear rule
developed. Although the majority in the first few cases worked conscientiously to
set forth a clear test, the splintered pluralities of the more recent decisions have
served only to muddy the waters.45
The Court's current interpretation of due process as it relates to personal
jurisdiction began with International Shoe v. Washington.46 International Shoe, the
starting point for every modem case on jurisdiction, established the "minimum
contacts" test for exercising jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation. By a
seven-to-one majority,47 the Court held that the defendant must have minimum
contacts with the forum such that the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. 48 If the defendant corporation does not possess this
level of contact with the forum, the court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction
consistent with due process. Despite the Court's attempt to define due process
requirements clearly, lower courts struggled with the question of exactly what type
of contacts would suffice. Hanson v. Denckla,49 decided thirteen years after
International Shoe, attempted to deal with this problem and clarify the standard by
setting forth a more concrete definition of minimum contacts: "It is essential in
each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State... ."'o During this
period the Court also defined the least amount of contact due process would allow.
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,"' the Court held that a single
insurance policy in the forum state satisfied minimum contacts, in part because the
state had a strong interest in protecting its citizens by making a local forum
available for suits against out-of-state corporations.5 2
Other decisions sought to outline the differences between general and specific
jurisdiction in light of the new constitutional requirements. International Shoe,
Hanson, and McGee all involved specific jurisdiction: that is, the suit arose from
44 See infra note 46.
41 See infra notes 46-79 and accompanying text.
4 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
41 Justice Jackson did not take part in the decision.
" Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
49 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
'o Id. at 253.
5' 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
52 See id. at 223.
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the defendant's contacts with the host forum. In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co.," the Court sought to answer the remaining question: what type of
contacts were required for cases of general jurisdiction, where the suit did not arise
from the defendant's in-state contacts. Perkins established that for a court to
exercise general jurisdiction over a non-resident corporation, that defendant's
contacts with the forum must be "continuous and systematic," '54 such that
jurisdiction comports with "general fairness to the corporation."" More than thirty
years later, the Court elucidated this standard in Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall," which affirmed the "continuous and systematic" rule of
Perkins and held that mere purchases in the forum state, even if made regularly, are
not sufficient contacts for general jurisdiction."
The due process requirements for personal jurisdiction seemed to be a" settled
area of law following the Hanson-McGee-Perkins trio of the 1950s. Thirty years
later, the Court decided that the time had come to reconsider the issue, although it
soon became clear that the modem Court lacked the cohesion of prior decades. The
1980s line of personal jurisdiction cases began with World- Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson." The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen held that the mere fact that a
defendant's products find their way into a forum does not create minimum contacts;
rather, there must be some effort to market to the forum such that the defendant
"should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."59 The dissenters, in
contrast, argued that because the product in question was a car, the defendant knew
that it would probably travel to distant fora, regardless of whether they marketed
there.' Justice Brennan's dissent also noted that the plaintiffs brought the suit in
the forum where they were injured, that they were still in the hospital in that state
when they filed the claim, and that key witnesses and evidence were there, a
combination that made jurisdiction more reasonable.6
The mid-1980s saw three important cases regarding personal jurisdiction. The
first of these, Calder v. Jones,62 established a new standard for jurisdiction: the
"effects test."63 The Court in Calder held that a forum can assert personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a tort case if the defendant knew that
53 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
14 Id. at 445.
55 Id.
56 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
'7 See id. at417.
58 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
19 Id. at 297.
o See id at 314-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 318 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61 See id. at 305-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
63 See id.
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its actions were likely to cause harm within the forum.' In essence, if the defendant
knew that the "brunt of the harm"'" would be in the forum state, it should have
"reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court there" to answer for its actions.66
The second major case from mid-decade, Helicopteros, involved minimum contacts
for general jurisdiction, as discussed above.67 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,68
the third case, added more factors to the minimum contacts test. The Court held
that a state can constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant based on the existence of a contract with an in-state plaintiff, although
a contract alone does not automatically createjurisdiction.69 While the Court noted
that such a contract, particularly one with a choice-of-law provision, should be
given great weight in the analysis, it also attached significance to other factors, such
as prior negotiations and the fact that the defendant's long-standing relationship
with a Florida corporation was a "deliberate affiliation with the forum State" that
reinforced "the reasonable foreseeability of possible litigation there."70  The
dissenters, in contrast, believed that the contract here did not give the defendant
adequate notice that it could be sued in the forum because the contract and other
dealings had not taken place in that forum and because there was inequality of
bargaining power."
Arguably the most confusing decision of the 1980sjurisdiction cases wasAsahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.7 Asahi arose when the plaintiff was injured
while riding a motorcycle, the tire of which was allegedly defective. He sued the
Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire tube, who impleaded Asahi, the Japanese
manufacturer of the tiretube valve assembly. All parts of the suit settled except for
the impleader action against Asahi." Asahi sold more than one million assemblies
to the third party plaintiff, who used them in its tires. Asahi knew that the finished
products would end up in the United States and particularly California; however,
it made no direct sales there, had no offices or agents in the country, and did not
control the distribution system that ultimately placed its products in California.74
Although all nine justices found that California could not exercise jurisdiction
over Asahi consistent with due process, Asahi's precedential value remains
questionable because the case produced only a splintered plurality holding. The
64 See id. at 789.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 790.
67 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
68 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
69 See id. at 478.
70 Id. at 482.
7. See id. at 488-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
71 See id. at 106.
74 See id. at 107.
. [Vol. 9:1
THE FOUNDERS Go ON-LINE
main opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, held that Asahi lacked minimum
contacts with California because it did not commit an action "purposefully directed
toward the forum State."75 O'Connor wrote that simply placing a product in the
stream of commerce with knowledge that the product would be swept into a distant
forum, without more, does not constitute such a purposeful act.76 Only three
justices signed this part of O'Connor's opinion. O'Connor then concluded that
even if Asahi did have minimum contacts, jurisdiction over Asahi would not be
reasonable because of California's weak interest in hearing a case between two
foreign parties." Seven justices subscribed to this part of the opinion. Four
members of the court signed a concurrence, authored by Justice Brennan, that
concluded that Asahi did have minimum contacts based on its knowledge that the
final product would be sold in California and its economic benefits from those sales,
but that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.78 Justice Stevens,
writing for himself only, found thatjurisdiction would be unreasonable and thus did
not reach the minimum contacts issue.79
Despite its early effort to create a simple "minimum contacts" test for personal
jurisdiction due process requirements, the Court's decisions since International
Shoe have only confused the issue. With every new case, the Court set forth new
standards and catch phrases, befuddling the attorneys and judges who sought
simplicity and consistency. By the late 1980s, the Court itself seemed confused and
splintered on the issue, as demonstrated by the fragmented Asahi decision. It was
against this rather unclear background that modern courts first faced a new and
complex twist onjurisdiction, and one that was, in all probability, totally unforeseen
by the Founding Fathers: the Internet.
II. THE SHORT, CONFUSED HISTORY OF INTERNET JURISDICTION 0
A. The Circuits' View of an On-Line World
The dawning of the cyberspace era in the mid-1990s presented courts with new
SId. at 112 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
76 See id
17 See id. at 114-15.
78 See id. at 117 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7" See id at 121 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8" See generally David Bender, Personal Jurisdiction and Websites, 547 PRAC. L. INST.
67 (1998); Joseph S. Pevsner and Gregory W. Curry, Down the Block But Outside
Jurisdiction: Personal Jurisdiction in a Modern World, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 977 (1998);
Russell D. Shurtz, www. internationalshoe.com: Analyzing Weber v. Jolly Hotels'
Paradigm for Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1663 (1998);
Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More Is Required on
the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925 (1998).
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jurisdiction problems. Although courts have long recognized that physical presence
is not required for personal jurisdiction,"' the Internet took this theory beyond its
logical extreme. Electronic contacts know no physical boundaries at all, and once
a company establishes an on-line presence, it is generally accessible by anyone with
a modem-regardless of what market the company intends to reach. The
"purposeful availment" standard thus became even less clear, as companies realized
the difficulty of establishing electronic boundaries and the ease with which their
web sites could reach distant fora.
By 1996, courts began to see parties arguing over whether electronic contacts
could create jurisdiction. The circuits largely avoided dealing with the issue,
reviewing only six cases on Internet jurisdiction between 1996 and 1999, and the
Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari on a case raising the issue. Despite the
circuits' efforts to create a simple standard that comported with the traditional
minimum contacts due process analysis, the circuit decisions provide limited
precedential value. In addition to changing the way courts look atjurisdiction, the
Internet has also apparently changed the way courts look at each other, as the rule
that emerged came not from a circuit court, but from a single judge in the Western
District of Pennsylvania.
The Sixth Circuit decided the first circuit court case involving Internet
jurisdiction. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson82 involved CompuServe, an Internet
service provider incorporated in Ohio, and Richard Patterson, a citizen of Texas.
Patterson entered into a standard agreement with CompuServe, allowing him to
transmit files to CompuServe's Ohio servers, which CompuServe's subscribers
could then download for use and purchase. Patterson claimed that CompuServe
infringed his trademarks on these files, and demanded $100,000 to settle all
potential claims.8 3 Relying on diversity jurisdiction, CompuServe sued in Ohio
federal court for a declaratory judgment that it did not infringe Patterson's
trademarks, and Patterson moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
arguing that his only contacts with Ohio were electronic. 4
The court found that jurisdiction did not violate due process. Citing World-
Wide Volkswagen and McGee, the court noted that modern communication and
transportation had resulted in a relaxation of due process requirements for
defending in a distant forum: "Simply stated, there is less perceived need today for
the federal constitution to protect defendants from 'inconvenient litigation,' because
all but the most remote forums are easily accessible for the pursuit of both business
8" See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476 (1985) ("[j]urisdiction
... may not be avoided merely because the defendant did not physically enter the forum
State"); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-75 (1984).
82 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
83 See id. at 1261.
84 See id.
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and litigation."" The decision also declared that Patterson should have "reasonably
anticipate[d] being haled into court" in Ohio because he "purposefully availed
himself' of the Ohio market by sending his files to CompuServe's servers and by
placing them on the network for sale; in effect, Patterson used CompuServe as his
"distribution center." 6 The Sixth Circuit further noted as significant that Patterson
clicked the "I agree" button on CompuServe's on-line contract, which included a
clause specifying Ohio law as controlling. While noting that neither placing a
product in commerce nor signing a contract would independently constitute
minimum contacts, 7 the court held that the combination of both actions made
Patterson amenable to suit in Ohio consonant with due process. 8
Far from settling the issue, CompuServe provided only a thin precedential
rationale for exercising jurisdiction via electronic contacts, and soon other circuits
began creating their own standards for minimum on-line contacts. Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 9 for example, held that the defendant's on-line contacts
were not sufficient to conferjurisdiction. Bensusan involved a dispute between two
restaurants, both of which used the name "The Blue Note." The New York
restaurant owner (Bensusan) sued the Missouri restaurant owner (King) for
trademark infringement stemming from the Missouri restaurant's web site. The
allegedly infringing site contained a disclaimer that it should not be confused with
"one of the world's finest jazz club [sic] Blue Note, located in the heart of New
York's Greenwich Village."" This text was hyperlinked to Bensusan's web page.
The Second Circuit found that New York did not have jurisdiction over King
under the state's long-arm statute, and thus did not reach the due process issue.9
New York's long-arm statute allowed for jurisdiction over non-residents who, in
person or through agents, committed tortious acts in New York.92 King's allegedly
tortious act was committed via the Internet, rather than in person, so the court held
that New York could not exercise jurisdiction over King.93 Although often cited as
an example of insufficient on-line contacts, Bensusan has little precedential value
because the holding rests on the state long-arm statute rather than on due process
grounds.
Cybersell v. Cybersell,94 by contrast, is the most frequently cited circuit court
85 Id. at 1262.
86 Id. at 1263.
87 See id. at 1265 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,478 (1985) and
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)).
88 See id.
89 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
90 Id. at 27.
9' See id. at 29.
92 See id. at 28.
9' See id. at 29.
94 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
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decision on Internet jurisdiction. In this case, Cybersell, an Arizona corporation,
sued Cybersell, a Florida corporation, for allegedly infringing the former's
federally-registered service mark. The basis for the suit was the defendant's
maintenance of a web site that contained a logo incorporating the word "Cybersell"
and large letters proclaiming "Welcome to Cybersell." g Because Arizona's long-
arm statute granted jurisdiction to the full extent of due process, the court
performed a due process analysis.96 After citing CompuServe and Bensusan as
examples of the two opposite extremes, the court proceeded to rely on a district
court opinion (Zippo Manufacturing, discussed infra) as the basis of analysis.97 The
court ultimately held that it could not exercise jurisdiction over the defendant
because the defendant's web site was "passive" in nature and because there was no
evidence that the defendant directed its activities toward Arizona or ever conducted
business there.98
CompuServe, Bensusan, and Cybersell seemed to indicate a trend of looking
first to the state's long-arm statute and then conducting a traditional due process
analysis based on the nature of the on-line contacts. Panavision International v.
Toeppen,9 in contrast, took a different approach. Panavision involved a dispute
over an Internet domain name."° Panavision, a Delaware corporation with its
principle place of business in California, held the federal trademarks for its name
as well as the names of several of its products. When it tried to register its company
name as a domain name, however, it could not do so because Dennis Toeppen, a
resident of Illinois, had already registered it for himself.' When Panavision
informed Toeppen that he was violating federal trademark law, Toeppen offered to
sell the domain name for $13,000. When Panavision refused, Toeppen registered
Panavision's other federal trademark, "panaflex," as a domain name. Panavision
then sued Toeppen in the Central District of California, arguing that Toeppen was
a "cyber pirate" who made money by registering various trademarked names as
domain names and offering the trademark owners the opportunity to "buy" them.0 2
9' Seeid. at415.
96 See id. at 416.
9 See id at 417-18.
98 See id. at 419.
9 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
'0 A "domain name" is a location identifier for a web site, consisting of a word followed
by ".com" for commercial users, ".edu" for education, ".org" for organizations, ".gov" for
government, or ".net" for networks. Companies frequently register their names as their
domain name (i.e., "panavision.com") because this makes finding their site fairly intuitive
for their customers.
'1 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319.
02 See id. Toeppen also owned the domain names for Delta Airlines, Neiman Marcus,
Eddie Bauer, American Standard, and others, and had been sued several times as a result.
See, e.g., Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
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The Ninth Circuit held that it could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over
Toeppen. °3 The court summarized CompuServe and Cybersell, but declined to
follow the reasoning of either decision, arguing instead that its prior decision in
Cybersell was actually alluding to the "effects doctrine" of Calder v. Jones."4 It
then held that jurisdiction over Toeppen was proper because Toeppen knew that
Panavision would feel the brunt of his tortious act in California, the location of
Panavision's principal place of business. 5 The opinion noted that merely
registering someone else's name would not be sufficient to conferjurisdiction, but
that Toeppen's "scheme" of registering companies' names was the "something
more" required forjurisdiction under Cybersell.'" After finding sufficient contacts,
the court examined the Burger King reasonableness factors and held in favor of
Panavision because Toeppen's acts were aimed at California, because California
had a strong interest in protecting its citizens' trademarks, and because the burden
on Toeppen of litigating in California was "significant, but the inconvenience is not
so great as to deprive him of due process.' 'j °7
Although the Ninth Circuit clearly tried to square Panavision with Cybersell,
other circuits recognized that the decisions were contradictory. The Third Circuit
took such a stance in Imo Industries v. Kiekert, "' a case that did not even involve
on-line contacts. Imo resulted when Imo, a Delaware corporation with its principle
place of business in New Jersey, put shares of a wholly-owned subsidiary up for
sale and Kiekert, a German company, placed a bid. Several unfriendly business
actions and threats took place, culminating in Imo's suit against Kiekert for tortious
activity resulting in damages.'" Using a Calder analysis, the court held that it could
not exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process."' The opinion cited to
Cybersell as support for the dismissal,"' and noted Panavision as contrary
authority," 2 despite the Ninth Circuit's implication in Panavision "' that the two
cases were consistent. Although Imo did not involve on-line contacts, many district
courts have cited it as authority for the proposition that Calder should be read
conservatively when applied to business torts." 4 Imo thus has led to the dismissal
103 Id. at 1327.
104 465 U.S. 783 (1984); see supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
105 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321.
'o See id at 1322 (citing Cybersell v. Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997)).
'07 Id. at 1323 (quoting district court opinion, Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp.
616, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).
8os 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998).
'" See id. at 257-58.
"10 See id at 265.
... See id. at 264.
"2 See id. at 264, n.7.
13 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322.
"4 See, e.g., Eagle Computer Assoc. v. Chesapeake Software Serv., Inc., No. 99-CV-
2583, 1999 WL 1030441 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 1999); Wempe v. Sunrise Med. HHG, Inc., 61
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of cases where the plaintiff relied on the "effects test" for Internet jurisdiction.'
CompuServe, Bensusan, Cybersell, and Panavision all attempted to create a
standard for determining when due process permits a court to exercise jurisdiction
over a defendant whose contacts with the forum were virtual. The most recent
circuit court decisions on the issue, however, have shown that these cases were
unsuccessful in their efforts. Mink v. AAAA Development". did not cite to any of
these cases in its analysis of Internet jurisdiction. The case involved David Mink,
a Texas resident, who developed a computer program and applied for both patent
and copyright registration. Richard Stark approached Mink and asked if he would
be interested in marketing his software in conjunction with Stark's products at a
seminar. Mink, considering the offer, gave Stark a demonstration of his program." 7
Mink claimed that Stark then conspired with two companies, including the
defendant Vermont corporation, to copy Mink's program. Mink filed suit in the
Southern District of Texas." 8
Texas' long-arm statute extended to the full limit of due process, so the court
performed a minimum contacts analysis for general jurisdiction (Mink did not show
any contacts related to the harm, so the court did not consider specific jurisdiction).
In a fairly short analysis, the Fifth Circuit held that "the reasoning of Zippo
[Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Corn, infra] is persuasive""' 9 and adopted that court's
"sliding scale" as the rule for the Fifth Circuit. Using the Zippo analysis, the court
held that the defendant's web site, which contained a downloadable mail-in order
form, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses, was "passive" and therefore not
grounds for exercising personal jurisdiction.20 The court relied exclusively on the
Western District of Pennsylvania's rule from Zippo, and did not attempt to use any
of the standards set forth by other circuits or by district courts within its own circuit.
The most recent circuit court decision on the issue, Soma Medical International
v. Standard Chartered Bank, '' similarly relied on Zippo. The Soma court found
that a passive web site soliciting business was insufficient to subject the defendant
to general jurisdiction in Utah. Although the opinion did not cite exclusively to
F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Kan. 1999); Clearclad Coatings, Inc. v. Xontal Ltd., No. 98-C-7199,
1999 WL 652030 (N.D. Ii. Aug. 20, 1999); Banner Promotions, Inc. v. Maldonado, 56 F.
Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Waimberg v. Med. Trans. of Am., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 511
(E.D. Pa. 1999); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
' See, e.g., Eagle, 1999 WL 1030441, at *4; Banner, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 554; Barrett, 44
F. Supp. 2d at 730; Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Allibert, No. CIV.A. 97-3914, 1998 WL
966017 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1998).
116 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
".. See id. at 335.
118 See id
"9 Id at 336.
120 See id
121 196 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Zippo, the other cases mentioned included a Utah district court case (quoting
Zippo), Mink (adopting Zippo), Cybersell (citing Zippo with approval and quoting
Zippo), and a District of Kansas case (using a Zippo analysis).'22
The Third Circuit's observation in Imo that the Ninth Circuit's decisions were
incongruous, as well as the Mink court's failure to cite to any circuit decisions as
authority and the Soma court's exclusive reliance on cases citing a district court
case, demonstrate that no clear rule emerged from the circuit courts' Internet
jurisdiction cases. In fact, the cases contain little consistency at all, except for the
apparent urge to rely on the only decision that did state a clear rule, the district court
ruling in Zippo Manufacturing.
B. A District in Circuit Court Clothing
Despite the circuits' attempts to make a simple rule to be followed by the
district courts, it is clear that the districts, as well as at least one circuit court, have
declined to follow what little guidance they have offered. The district courts facing
Internetj urisdiction problems generally cite to the circuit decisions as examples, but
not as the basis, for analysis. This is not to say, however, that the districts lack
consistency. All districts, as well as the Fifth Circuit in Mink, the Ninth Circuit in
Cybersell, and the Tenth Circuit in Soma, consistently rely upon a single authority:
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,'23 a district court case.
Zippo arose when Zippo Manufacturing, a Pennsylvania corporation and makers
of the familiar Zippo lighters, sued Zippo Dot Coin, a California corporation
offering a web-based news service, in the Western District of Pennsylvania for
federal trademark violations. Zippo Dot Coin had registered the domain names
"zippo.com," "zippo.net," and "zipponews.com," and when the company sent
messages or news, the word "Zippo" appeared as the sender. Although Zippo Dot
Corn maintained no offices or agents in Pennsylvania, its news service was available
to anyone with an Internet connection and a credit card. 24
The district court held that it could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over
Zippo Dot Corn because the company's web site reached out to Pennsylvania and
invited its citizens to do business with it. The judge in Zippo proposed a "sliding
scale" for minimum contacts on the Internet, coining the often-quoted rule that "the
likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity
conducts over the Internet."'25 Zippo suggested a three-category sliding scale for
12 Id. at 1296.
123 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
114 Seeid. at 1121.
121 Id. at 1124.
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the "nature and quality" of Internet contacts. 26 "Passive" web sites, such as the one
in Bensusan, were analogized to magazine advertisements, and were found to be
insufficient to establish jurisdiction.'27 "Active" web sites, where the defendant
clearly does business or allows others to enter into contracts over the Internet,
involve knowing and repeated transmissions to the forum state and therefore should
confer jurisdiction.'28 "Interactive" sites, where a user can exchange information
with the host computer but cannot conduct business, pose more of a problem.'29
These sites, according to the court, require courts to analyze the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the Internet contacts in accordance with
traditional due process and minimum contacts requirements. 3 ' The court found that
Zippo Dot Coin's site was "active" because customers could order and pay for the
service on-line, and that the company thus had minimum contacts with
Pennsylvania. 3'
III. DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS: THE GOOD, THE BAD,
AND THE COMPLETELY CONFUSED
A. A General Statistical Analysis
Since Internet-based federal jurisdiction emerged as an issue in 1996, at least
sixty-two district court cases have considered the question.'32 A careful analysis of
these decisions reveals not only the district courts' confusion, but also the structural
and procedural difficulties that lie ahead.
The most notable commonality among the Intemetjurisdiction cases is their use
of precedent. Beginning in March 1997,' only two months after the Western
District of Pennsylvania laid down the Zippo opinion, every district court examining
on-line contacts cited to Zippo, even though CompuServe offered a valid circuit






131 See id. At 1125.
132 This number is derived from my own survey of cases decided between 1996 and 1999,
including cases brought both under diversity jurisdiction and under the Lanham Act of 1946,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127. Although, technically, suits brought under the Lanham Act have
federal question jurisdiction, the Act does not provide national service of process, so the due
process/jurisdictional analysis asks the same questions and uses the same principles as
diversity jurisdiction cases. For a complete list of the sixty-two cases contained in this
statistical analysis, see infra app. A.
' See Resuscitation Tech., Inc. v. Cont'l Health Care Corp., No. IP 96-1457-C-M/S,
1997 WL 148567 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997).
[Vol. 9:1
THE FOUNDERS Go ON-LINE
1998 and 1999, despite the fact that by the end of 1999, six circuit court decisions
from five different circuits had issued relevant opinions. Highlighting this
structural problem is the fact that the districts did not cite Zippo as a mere example:
most relied almost exclusively on that case as the basis of their analysis and by early
1998 only cited the circuit decisions as mere sample fact patterns to illustrate the
logic of Zippo.34
The district court cases based on Zippo seem to favor dismissal. Of the fifty-six
Internet jurisdiction cases since Zippo, thirty-four found that the court lacked
jurisdiction,' although it is not at all clear that Zippo or the circuit decisions
compel such a result. This trend may not be of national significance, however,
because the results between districts vary so wildly. For example, compare the two
districts that have decided the largest number of Internetjurisdiction cases in 1999.
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed all seven of the on-line contacts
cases it heard in 1999 for lack of jurisdiction," 6 while the Northern District of
Illinois found jurisdiction to be proper for four of the five cases it heard in the same
year.'37 Such disparate results demonstrate the lack of a clear standard for
establishing jurisdiction based on virtual contacts, in addition to the obvious
structural danger of using a lower court decision, rather than a circuit court opinion,
as the seminal case.
"' See, e.g., Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 742-43 (W.D. Tex.
1998) ("In a recent opinion from the Western District of Pennsylvania, the court discussed
the 'sliding scale' ... At one end are situations where a defendant clearly does business over
the Internet ... See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson [citations omitted]. At the other end are
passive Web site situations... See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King [citations omitted].").
For a list of cases, see infra app. A.
136 See S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Pa.
1999); Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Med. Surgical Prod. Ltd., 64 F. Supp. 2d 448
(E.D. Pa. 1999); Hurley v. Cancun Playa Oasis Int'l Hotels, No. 99-574, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13716 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1999); Resnick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D. Pa.
1999); Remick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 452 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Barrett v. Catacombs
Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Desktop Tech., Inc. v. Colorworks Reprod. &
Design, Inc., No. 98-5029, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1934 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1999).
"' See McMaster-Carr Supply Co. v. Supply Depot, Inc., No. 98-C- 1903, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9559 (N.D. I11. June 14, 1999) (jurisdiction); Coolsavings.com, Inc. v. IQ.Commerce
Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (N.D. Il. 1999) (jurisdiction); Int'l Star Registry v. Bowman-
Haight Ventures, Inc., No. 98-C-6823, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7009 (N.D. I1. May 4, 1999)
(jurisdiction); Pheasant Run, Inc. v. Moyse, No. 98-C-4202, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1087
(N.D. III. Feb. 2, 1999) (no jurisdiction); LFG, LLC v. Zapata Corp., No. 98-C-5096, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10074 (N.D. I11. Jan. 13, 1999) (jurisdiction). Note, however, that
comparisons of general results analyzed by district courts present problems because of the
varying nature of the contacts involved in each case. In the instant example, several of the
Pennsylvania cases involved claims of general jurisdiction, which is necessarily more
difficult to establish than specific jurisdiction.
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B. Individual Analyses
While overall district statistics show confusion between districts, individual
cases show confusion within districts as well. Although all the recent opinions
chose to cite to Zippo as authority, some courts fail to distinguish the facts of the
cases before them, resulting in opinions that avoid mentioning circuit decisions in
favor of citing to a district court decision that arguably does not support their
analysis.
Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Medical Surgical Products Ltd.'38
presents an example of a court whose reluctance to explore the novel issues inherent
in the jurisdictional problem led to an inadequate opinion. The plaintiff argued that
the defendant's two web sites conferred general jurisdiction. One of the sites
allowed users to place their names on mailing lists for product information; both
sites advertised the defendant's products and offered direct ordering simply by
clicking on a product.' 39 In its presentation of applicable law, the Molnlycke court
simply inserted a lengthy near-quote from the Zippo opinion, citing directly to Zippo
and indirectly to two other decisions from its district that used the Zippo analysis. 4
The court acknowledged that Zippo's sliding scale has been properly applied to
general jurisdiction but then proceeded to hold, without any citation of authority,
that web sites (even those that sell products) cannot establish generalj urisdiction. 4'
Although it is understandable that the court would be reluctant to expose all
companies whose web sites sell products to general jurisdiction wherever the site
is accessible, it could have reached the same conclusion by analyzing precedent
rather than by avoiding it. The opinion then strayed even farther from Zippo, citing
state cases unrelated to Internet law for the proposition that the defendant's web
sites "are akin to ... a general advertising campaign"'42 and thus did not target
Pennsylvania regardless of actual sales there. After holding that general jurisdiction
does not exist-and indeed, cannot exist-for web sites, the court denied the
plaintiff's motion for discovery on the jurisdictional issue, relying on the
defendant's uncontested affidavit regarding its Pennsylvania contacts.'43 This
response, combined with the court's ultimate decision to transfer the case, seems
designed to purge the case from its docket, especially given that jurisdictional
discovery requests should be freely granted 44 and that it would be difficult for the
plaintiff to contest the defendant's affidavit without such information.
64 F. Supp. 2d 448 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
'3 See id. at 451.
140 See id
141 See id.
142 Id. at 452.
143 See id.
144 See Renner v. Lanard Toys Ltd., 33 F.3d 277, 283-84 (3rd Cir. 1994).
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Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music'45 also failed to utilize
precedent properly. The court quickly discounted the plaintiff s assertion of general
jurisdiction, noting that no case had ever asserted general jurisdiction based on a
web site.146 The limited amount of contacts present in this case probably justified
the result as well as the court's dismissive tone.
Millenium's specific jurisdiction issue, however, presented more complex
problems, and the court's analysis of them is considerably more suspect. Although
the defendant's web site had on-line sales capability (making the site "active" under
the Zippo analysis), the court took the unusual viewpoint that doing business over
the Internet only conferred specific jurisdiction when the company conducted a
"significant portion of their business through ongoing Internet relationships."' 47
The opinion cited to Zippo as support for this proposition, quoting that court's
statement that jurisdiction would be valid where the company entered "into
contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet."' 48  This excerpt
accurately quotes the words of the Zippo court; however, Millennium takes them out
of context. The selection quoted was merely an example of the type of activity that
would confer jurisdiction and was preceded in Zippo by the sentence: "At one end
of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the
Internet."' 49 Read together, Zippo intended that defendants doing business over the
Internet with a foreign jurisdiction, such as where there are repeated file transfers,
should be susceptible to jurisdiction there-the interpretation most courts accept.
Indeed, the Millennium court acknowledged that its decision conflicted with
precedent: "The court recognizes that its reasoning is at odds with some cases
addressing this new issue."' 0
After incorrectly citing Zippo as support for its main holding, Millennium went
on to misuse Zippo's fairly straightforward "sliding scale." Even though the
defendants clearly did business over the Internet and had one of the most "active"
web sites one could imagine, the Millennium court found that the defendants had
"done nothing more than publish an interactive Web site" that "[fell] into the
middle category [of the sliding scale], requiring further inquiry into the 'level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information' . . . .'""
Following this flawed determination of the web site's proper category, the court
broadly stated that "[t]he existence of a Web site, whether passive or interactive,
"' 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999).
146 See id. at 910.
14 Id. at 920.
148 Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997),
quoted in Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
149 Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
50 Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 922.
151 Id at 920.
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does not rise to the requisite level of conduct,"' rendering the entire analysis of the
site's category a useless exercise. Although the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction was the correct decision (the defendant's only sale in the jurisdiction
was one manufactured by the plaintiff), the Millennium court's reliance on Zippo
for a holding that the precedent did not support reveals the problems with the
circuits' failure to supply a clear rule.
In the void left by the circuits, many other districts have also fallen prey to
inadequate analysis or misuse of precedent. Fishel v. BASF Group,'53 for example,
glossed over the Internet contacts issue in a paragraph. The Fishel court had before
it five corporate defendants, each of which maintained a web site in addition to
other contacts with the forum. In analyzing the first defendant's web site, the court
stated that the site was "passive" under Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. '54 and
cited to a section of that case that was actually a lengthy quote from Zippo.' The
Fishel court offered no detail or analysis of the web site; it merely stated that the
web site was passive and that passive sites alone do not establish minimum contacts,
citing again to Smith.' The court made no effort to analyze whether the web site,
when added to the other contacts, created jurisdiction. For three of the other four
defendants, the court added a one-sentence paragraph stating that the issue of
passive web sites was addressed previously, again offering no justification for why
the sites were categorized as passive. 57 The fifth defendant's web site, though
noted in the facts of the case, is not mentioned in the court's analysis at all.'
The jurisdictional analyses (or lack thereof) in Molnlycke, Millennium, and
Fishel reveal the district courts' discomfort with on-line contacts as a basis for
jurisdiction, as well as the contradictory but predictable result of the lack of a clear
standard set by a mid- or upper-level appellate court. Both general statistics and
individual opinions demonstrate that the passive/active distinction has become
either an excuse for quickly dismissing cases whose technology-oriented issues
make the courts uncomfortable or, perhaps more likely, a convenient way to clear
their dockets.
C. On a Happier Note
This is not to say, however, that all courts have fallen prey to shallow analysis
or unjustified dismissal. The court in International Star Registry of Illinois v.
152 Id. at 922.
'5' No. 4-96-CV-10449, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21230 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 11, 1998).
114 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).
' See id. at 1365.
156 See Fishel, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21230, at * 14.
1'7 See id at *16, *18.
158 See id. at*19.
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Bowman-Haight Ventures, Inc.'59 found Internet-based contacts sufficient to
establish jurisdiction. The defendant's contacts with the forum state in
International Star Registry were entirely electronic-all of its advertising and most
of its sales in Illinois arose from its web site, which was not targeted at any one
geographic area.'60 Unlike Millennium, which noted that the defendant conducted
sales in the forum but not a sufficient amount to support jurisdiction, the court in
International Star Registry found jurisdiction proper even though only sixty-five
of the defendant's 1,637 sales transactions (less than four percent of its total
revenue) involved Illinois residents.' 6' The court's analysis properly began with the
state long-arm statute and then extended to the Supreme Court's minimum contacts
and due process requirements. 162 After pointedly noting that the Seventh Circuit
had yet to issue an opinion regarding on-line contacts, the court commenced an
extensive exploration of the existing case law. Rather than citing exclusively to
Zippo, the court noted the sliding scale framework and cited to cases from its own
district adopting the Zippo analysis. 63 International Star Registry thoroughly
examined the online contacts issue, citing to nineteen district court cases and three
of the four circuit decisions available at the time, with parentheticals explaining
each holding. The court took note of Millennium's argument that the Internet is not
directed at any one state, but ultimately reached the logical conclusion that the
defendant repeatedly secured economic benefit from Illinois residents and that it
thus "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
Illinois."'" Despite International Star Registry's apparent nonconformity with
other districts, the court acted more faithfully to precedent and to its duty to
thoroughly research and analyze the issue than many of its contemporaries.
Like all types of cases, on-line contacts cases have good decisions and bad
decisions; however, a clear trend has emerged. First, district courts appear eager
to dismiss these cases and have done so in more than sixty percent of the relevant
cases that have come before them.165 Second, the courts all cite to Zippo for support
of their decisions, regardless of which decision is reached. Third, only a small
minority cite to the circuit decisions-even to their own circuit-and even fewer
use the circuit decisions as a basis of analysis. Finally, none of the cases inquire
into the original intent of diversityjurisdiction, despite the fact that such an analysis
could achieve the same results without torturing precedent.
1 No. 98-C-6823, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7009 (N.D. I11. May 4, 1999).
'60 See id. at *5.
161 See id. at *6.
162 See id. at*7-*10.
163 See id. at*1l-*12.
164 Id at *17.
165 See infra, app. A.
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V. AN ORIGINAL INTENT PROBLEM
Whether based on a reluctance to explore new issues, a fear of the modem
technologies involved, a desire to clear their dockets quickly, or simply an honest
belief that minimum contacts do not exist, district courts seem intent on twisting
precedent in order to justify the ultimate dismissal of cases involving Internet
jurisdiction. Similar results could be reached with a less painful analysis, however,
by looking to the original intent of federal diversity jurisdiction.
As noted in Part I, e-business is booming.'66 Although apparently beneficial for
the economy, commerce seemingly without boundaries poses a serious problem for
courts, particularly for federal courts in search of a clear rule for diversity
jurisdiction. Because of the Internet's lack of geographic limitations, the emergence
of on-line business threatens to increase the number of cases brought into the
federal system exponentially. For example, in 1999 district courts heard six times
the number of Internet jurisdiction cases they had heard just four years earlier,'67
and the influx will only worsen as on-line contracts and purchases become more
common.
Such a result could hardly be farther from the original intent. The Founders
reluctantly created federal diversity jurisdiction in response to concerns regarding
state court prejudice and the inability of fledgling state courts to handle complex,
multi-party litigation. 68 Because of life tenure of federal judges, broader jury
pools, increased judicial freedom, and more experienced judges, the federal courts
were originally considered more accomplished and elite, thus providing a
justification for moving as many cases as possible into the federal system.'69 It is
unlikely, however, that the Founders intended to channel cases into the federal
system permanently. Once the state courts became more stable and proficient,
Hamilton's elitistjustification for removing cases to the federal system disappeared.
Even James Madison, who authored the only Plan suggesting diversity,'7 intended
that much of the power given federal courts would be returned to state courts once
they were more firmly established. 7'
166 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
167 To illustrate, in 1996 federal district courts heard five cases involving on-line contacts.
In 1997, this number more than doubled, with federal courts hearing eleven such cases.
Sixteen cases were heard in 1998, and by 1999, the district courts decided more than thirty
Internet jurisdiction cases. For a list of citations, see infra app. A.
168 See supra notes 6-26 and accompanying text.
169 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
7 See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 593 app. C (Max Farrand,
ed., rev. ed. 1937) (the Virginia Plan); see also supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
'' See Felix Frankfurter, Distribution ofJudicial Power Between UnitedStates and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 522 (1928) (quoting Madison as saying that Congress will
return judicial power to the state courts "when they find the tribunals of the states
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The Founders' general lack of enthusiasm for federal diversity jurisdiction'72
demonstrates that they could not have intended for many diversity cases to end up
in the federal system. As noted in Part IIA, only one of the four plans submitted to
the Convention mentioned diversity jurisdiction,'73 and the supporters of the
Virginia Plan showed little interest in defending the provision: "The most
astounding thing.., is not the vigor of the attack but the apathy of the defense."
' 174
Had the Founders intended that federal courts sitting in diversity would hear the
number of cases the Internet now threatens to put before them, diversityjurisdiction
surely would have sparked more debate during both the Federal Constitutional
Convention of 1787 and the later state debates on ratification.
Other arguments also support the contention that diversity jurisdiction should
not be used for ordinary sales or contracts cases stemming from the Internet. First,
in creating diversity jurisdiction, the Founders could not have anticipated the
Internet or its impact on commerce and the courts. Today's world of instant
communications and fast travel was not a reality in 1787, and sales to distant fora
were uncommon. 75 Of the 539 cases brought in colonial and state courts from 1658
to 1787, only fifty-five involved parties of diverse origin, 76 indicating little
likelihood that diversity jurisdiction would overburden the federal system.
Second, the early implementation of diversityjurisdiction gave the Founders no
reason to reconsider this position, because few cases were brought in diversity.
From 1790 to 1800, the first decade of the new federal system of government, only
twenty-three of the 368 cases heard by the federal circuit courts involved diversity
jurisdiction. 177 Further buttressing this point is the fact that, of the few diversity
cases that arose, most involved disputes of international admiralty law, not
interstate tort or business claims.77 Given such statistics, the Founders hardly could
have anticipated that, more than 200 years later, an instantaneous communications
mechanism called the Internet would have the capability to draw nearly every
mundane sales dispute into federal court.
established on good footing").
172 See supra note 5 (discussing scholarly agreement that the Founders lacked enthusiasm
for diversity jurisdiction).
171 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
" Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis ofDiversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483,
487 (1928); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting the lack of interest in
diversity jurisdiction during the federal convention); supra notes 8-10 and accompanying
text (discussing the lack of debate on diversity jurisdiction during the state debates).
,175 See John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3,24(1948) ("There was too little significant interstate business litigation
to give room for serious actual abrasion.").
176 See id at 25.
177 See id at 17.
171 See id. at 18.
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Third and finally, many prominent scholars of the twentieth century have
argued for the abolishment or strict limitation of diversity jurisdiction, for varying
reasons. Felix Frankfurter reminded the legal world that diversity is constitutionally
permissible, not constitutionally mandated, and that Congress can (and should) do
away with diversity jurisdiction because of a lack of public policy supporting it.'79
Henry Friendly agreed, writing that the fears of state court prejudice were
speculative in 1787, and even less a reality today.' John Frank argued that the
Founders' motives for establishing diversity jurisdiction stemmed from their fear,
as wealthy land speculators, that state courts may harm their financial interests, and
that diversity thus has no overarching logical purpose.'' More recently, the
American Law Institute advocated a severe curtailment of diversity jurisdiction,'82
and Congress entertained several bills to either minimize or abolish the doctrine.'83
At least two federal circuit court judges have also advocated the abolition of
diversity jurisdiction.'84 It seems unlikely that such prominent and learned legal
scholars would argue against diversity jurisdiction if to curtail or abolish it would
seriously impair the efficacy of the court system. Both historical and modern
theoretical arguments are contrary to extending federal diversity jurisdiction to the
increasingly large number of Internet cases that could potentially qualify.
CONCLUSION
"'[C]yberspace' is not a 'space' at all. At least not in the way we understand
space. It's not located anywhere; it has no boundaries; you can't 'go' there. At the
bottom, the Internet is really more idea than entity."'85
' See Felix Frankfurter, Distribution ofJudicial Power Between UnitedStates and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 514, 521 (1928).
180 See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis ofDiversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV.
483, 510 (1928).
181 See Frank, supra note 175 at 19-21.
182 See The American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State
and Federal Courts, Official Draft, 1969.
183 See, e.g., Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205, 110
Stat. 3847, 3850 (increasing the amount in controversy requirement to $75,000); Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4642 (increasing the amount in
controversy requirement to $50,000 and limiting the exercise of alienage jurisdiction); H.R.
9622, 95th Cong. (1978) (proposing abolishment of diversity jurisdiction).
1' See Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the
Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671 (1992) (arguing that diversity jurisdiction is
incompatible with basic principles of federalism); Wilfred Feinberg, Is Diversity Jurisdiction
an Idea Whose Time Has Passed?, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1989, at 14 (arguing that diversity
jurisdiction cases clog federal dockets and noting that courts spend more time analyzing the
jurisdictional question than the underlying legal issues of the cases).
185 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44,48 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting Bruce W. Sanford
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Perhaps this explains, more than any minimum contacts analysis, why judges
seem so inclined to dismiss cases involving Internet contacts. The concepts are
unfamiliar, the rules are non-existent, and the implications are great. As one judge
wrote:
To impose traditional territorial concepts on the commercial uses of the
Internet has dramatic implications, opening the Web user up to
inconsistent regulations throughout fifty states, indeed, throughout the
globe. It also raises the possibility of dramatically chilling what may
well be "the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this
country-and indeed the world-has yet seen." ' 6
No judge wants to be responsible for destroying the world's new free speech forum
or for restricting the technology that has boosted the American economy to
unprecedented levels. Similarly, no judge wants to be responsible for opening the
floodgate to Internet cases brought under federal diversity jurisdiction.
Because many Internet disputes fit the literal requirements of diversity, courts
have looked to minimum contacts due process requirements to provide a rationale
for dismissing such cases. This method, however understandable, is inadequate and
unnecessarily complicated. Despite the fact that these courts have relied on the
same handful of relevant opinions to justify their decisions, the resulting
inconsistent holdings between, and even within, districts have caused widespread
uncertainty as to where a defendant really does have minimum contacts. Rather
than twisting precedents to reach the desired holding, judges should look to the
original intent of diversity jurisdiction. The Founders, though unaware that future
technology would create such legal dilemmas, clearly did not intend for federal
courts to handle every sales or contract dispute. If courts would look to the original
principles and ideas behind the Constitution, they would find a simple solution to
the jurisdictional quandary of the twenty-first century: the Internet.
CHRISTINE G HESLINGA
and Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The First Amendment in an
Online World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137, 1139-43 (1996)).
186 Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456,463 (D. Mass. 1997)
(quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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Appendix A
Recent District Court Decisions on Internet Jurisdiction (1996-1999)
1. Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996)
(jurisdiction).
2. McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. CIV. 95-4037, 1996 WL 753991
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996) (no jurisdiction).
3. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(jurisdiction).
4. Edias Software Int'l, LLC v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996)
(jurisdiction).
5. Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996)(jurisdiction).
6. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(jurisdiction).
7. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (no jurisdiction).
8. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997)
(jurisdiction).
9. Resuscitation Tech., Inc. v. Cont'l Health Care Corp., No. IP 96-1457-C-M/S,
1997 WL 148567 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997) (jurisdiction).
10. Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (no
jurisdiction).
11. Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997) (no jurisdiction).
12. Telco Communications Group, Inc. v. An Apple a Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 404
(E.D. Va. 1997) (jurisdiction).
13. Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997)
(jurisdiction).
14. Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97-C-4943, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18687 (N.D. II1. Nov. 12, 1997) (no jurisdiction).
15. SF Hotel Co. v. Energy Inv., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 1997) (no
jurisdiction).
16. Quality Solutions, Inc. v. Zupanc, 993 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
(jurisdiction).
17. Fishel v. BASF Group, No. 4-96-CV-10449, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21230
(S.D. Iowa Mar. 11, 1998) (no jurisdiction).
18. Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (jurisdiction).
19. Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (jurisdiction).
20. Tel. Audio Prod., Inc. v. Smith, No. 3:97-CV-0863-P, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4101 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 1998) (jurisdiction).
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21. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (jurisdiction).
22. Vitullo v. Velocity Powerboats, Inc., No. 97-C-8745, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7120 (N.D. I11. Apr. 24, 1998) (jurisdiction).
23. Scherr v. Abrahams, No. 97-C-5453, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8531 (N.D. I11.
May 29, 1998) (no jurisdiction).
24. CFOs 2 Go v. CFO 2 Go, No. C-97-4676SI, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8886 (N.D.
Cal. June 5, 1998) (no jurisdiction).
25. Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Conn. 1998) (no jurisdiction).
26. Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Utah 1998) (no
jurisdiction).
27. GTE New Media Serv. v. Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 1998)
(jurisdiction).
28. Advanced Software, Inc. v. Datapharm, Inc., No. CV-98-5943, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22091 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 1998) (no jurisdiction).
29. Atlantech Distrib., Inc. v. Credit Gen. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 534 (D. Md.
1 1998) (no jurisdiction).
30. K.C.P.L., Inc. v. Nash, No. 98 Civ. 3773, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18464
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1998) (no jurisdiction).
31. Grutkowski v. Steamboat Lake Guides & Outfitters, Inc., No. 98-1453, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20255 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1998) (no jurisdiction).
32. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 777 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (no jurisdiction).
33. Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or.
1999) (no jurisdiction).
34. LFG, LLC v. Zapata Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. II!. 1999) (jurisdiction).
35. ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323 (D.S.C. 1999) (no
jurisdiction).
36. Pheasant Run, Inc. v. Moyse, No. 98-C-4202, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1087
(N.D. 111. Feb. 2, 1999) (no jurisdiction).
37. Origin Instruments Corp. v. Adaptive Computer Sys., Inc., No. 3:97-CV-2595-
L, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1451 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 1999) (no jurisdiction).
38. Mid City Bowling Lanes & Sports Palace, Inc. v. Ivercrest, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d
507 (E.D. La. 1999) (no jurisdiction).
39. Desktop Tech., Inc. v. Colorworks Reprod. & Design, Inc., No. 98-5029, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1934 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1999) (no jurisdiction).
40. Purco Fleet Serv., Inc. v. Towers, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (D. Utah 1999)
(jurisdiction).
41. Fix My PC, L.L.C. v. N.F.N. Assoc., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 640 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(no jurisdiction).
42. Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (no
jurisdiction).
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43. Remick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 452 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (no jurisdiction).
44. Resnick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 462 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (no jurisdiction).
45. Int'l Star Registry of Iil. v. Bowman-Haight Ventures, Inc., No. 98-C-6823,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7009 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 1999) (jurisdiction).
46. Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel, 49 F. Supp. 2d 743 (D.N.J. 1999) (no
jurisdiction).
47. Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 1999) (jurisdiction).
48. Coolsavings.com, Inc. v. IQ.Commerce Corp., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (N.D. I11.
1999) (jurisdiction).
49. McMaster-Carr Supply Co. v. Supply Depot, Inc., No. 98-C-1903, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9559 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 1999) (jurisdiction).
50. Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681 (E.D. Va. 1999) (no
jurisdiction).
51. Coastal Video Communications Corp. v. Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 562
(E.D. Va. 1999) (no jurisdiction).
52. Am. Bio Medica Corp. v. Peninsula Drug Analysis Co., No. 99-218-SLR, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12455 (D. Del. Aug. 3, 1999) (jurisdiction).
53. Stem's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Herbert Mines Assoc., Inc., No. C-1-98-844, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10805 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 1999) (no jurisdiction).
54. Broussard v. Deauville Hotel Resorts, Inc., No. 98-3157, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12716 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 1999) (no jurisdiction).
55. Hurley v. Cancun Playa Oasis Int'l Hotels, No. 99-574, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13716 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1999) (no jurisdiction).
56. Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Dumex Med. Surgical Prod. Ltd., No. 99-1725,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13678 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 1999) (no jurisdiction).
57. Wise v. Lindamood, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Colo. 1999) (jurisdiction).
58. CIVIX-DDI, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99-B-172, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15230 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 1999) (no jurisdiction).
59. Kim v. Keenan, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (jurisdiction).
60. Loudon Plastics, Inc. v. Brenner Tool & Die, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 182
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (jurisdiction).
61. Bellino v. Simon, No. Civ. A. 99-2208, 1999 WL 1059753 (E.D. La. Nov. 22,
1999) (jurisdiction).
62. S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa.
1999) (no jurisdiction).
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